UNITED STATES vs. KOCHERSPERGER.

In the Circuit Court of the United Statesfor the .EasternDistrict
of Pennsylvania. In Equity.
UNITED STATES vs. KOCHERSPERGER.
1. The Acts of Congress of 2d March, 1827, sect. 3, forbidding all persons other
than the Postmaster-General, or his agents, from setting up any foot or horse
post for the conveyance of letters, &c., upon any post-road then or thereafter
established, and of 3d March, 1845, sect. 9, forbidding the establishment of any
private express for the conveyance of letters, &c., from a city, town, or place,
to another city, town, or place, between which the mail is regularly transported,
prohibit the business of private letter carriers on mail-routes, but not that of private letter carriers within the limits of a post-town.
2. In the Act of 3d March, 1851, sec. 10, authorizing the Postmaster-General "to
establish post-routes within the cities or towns" whose postmasters are appointed
by the President, the word post-routes is not synonymous with post-roads in the
Act of 1827.
3. The Postmaster-General having, conformably to the provisions of the Act of 1851,
and other statutes, established within the postal district of a city whose postmaster was appointed by the President, a local post for the collection and delivery of
letters, &c., not carried by mail, issued an order declaring that, under the
authority conferred by the Act of 1851, the streets of the city were established as
post-roads. This order did not make them post-roads within the meaning of the
Act of 1827, or make the business of private letter carriers within the postal district of the city, unlawful.

The cause was heard upon a demurrer to the bill, which prayed
an injunction to prohibit the defendants from continuing the business of letter carriers in which they were engaged in the City of
Philadelphia. The principal averments of the bill are stated below
.in the opinion of the Court.
CADWALADER,

J.-Judge Grier authorizes me to state that he

has perused the following opinion carefully, and that he fully concurs in it.
A post, etymologically defined, is a mode of conveying written
or unwritten intelligence, to and from appointed stations, at regular intervals, or whenever the performance of such service may
properly be required. The modes by which intelligence is transmitted through a post, otherwise than at regular intervals, are
usually called expresses Regular posts no longer transmit unwritten intelligence.
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A post-road is a public highway, whose use by the post is prescribed or authorized by law. A mail is a portable receptacle in
which letters, or packets of written or printed sheets, are conveyed
by post to an appointed station.
A post-office, according to the primary meaning of the word, is
an apartment, or building, at an appointed station, for the local
transaction of the business of the mail. No postal station is now
maintained without such an office.
No government has ever organized a system of posts without
securing to itself, to some extent, a monopoly of the carriage of
letters and mailable packets. The policy of such an exclusive
system is a subject of legislative, not of judicial, inquiry. But the
monopoly of the government is an optional, not an essential, part
of its postal system. The mere existence of a postal department
of the government is not an establishment of the monopoly. When
it is legislatively established, it may include one, or more, without
embracing all of the subjects of the government's postal arrangements. The business of private carriers of letters and mailable
packets, even on principal mail-routes, is lawful, unless legislatively
prohibited. A private monopolist, secured by prohibitory legislation, cannot require the suppression of a rival business of competitors who do not infringe the prohibition, merely because the continuance of their business would lessen or destroy the profits of his
monopoly. A like rule applies in determining the effect of a
government's legislative prohibitions to secure its own postal monopoly. The monopoly cannot be extended beyond the legislative
prohibitions merely because the continuance of a specific business
which has not been prohibited would reduce the postal earnings of
the government, or even frustrate the purposes of its exclusive
policy. The remedy, if required, is, in such a case, legislative.
These remarks are applicable to the laws which Congress has thought
necessary and proper for carrying the constitutional power to establish post-offices and post-roads into execution.
How far, if either post-offices alone, or post-roads alone, had been
mentioned in the Constitution, the carriage of mailable matter by
private persons could have been prohibited by Congress, might,
perhaps, under certain heads, have been a question attended with
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difficulties which do not exist under the Constitution as framed. If
the necessity or expediency of a postal monopoly is assumed, the
wisdom of expressly mentioning both post-offices and post-roads in
the Constitution must be conceded. Neither subject of the two-fold
constitutional power is altogether distinct or independent of the
other. But, as the words of the Constitution should be interpreted,
each subject of the power is to be regarded as additional to the
other. In the present case, the question is, not how far the constitutional power under either head extends, but how far it has
been legislatively carried into execution.
The policy of the postal statutes has been to establish, as postroads, those highways in every prescribed or authorized mail route,
which are within the general public domain of the respective States.
This has been done by declaring the respective mail-routes, postroads, authorizing the Postmaster-General to enter into temporary
contracts to extend the line of posts, and making prospectively the
roads designated in such contracts post-roads. The statutes also
make all navigable waters on which steamboats regularly pass,
from port to port, post-roads, and all completed railroads postroutes; and authorize the Postmaster-General to contract for carrying the mail on plank roads and navigable canals, declaring them
respectively, for such times and such distances as the mails may be
carried on them, post-roads. To obstruct or to retard the passage
of the mail, or to refuse to it the privilege of a public ferry, is
made penal. On such general public highways, natural or artificial, the citizens of each State are, under the Constitution, entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.
The States, in surrendering the powers which they have united in
delegating to the general government, had no prudential reasons
inducing them to restrict its postal authority over such highways.
But the constitutional power to establish State roads as postroads, can be executed only by the designation of actual public
highways, present or future, for use by carriers of the mail. The
existence and continuance of suci highways are independent of
congressional control. Congress cannot regulate their use, or
secure their permanence. When they cease to be common public
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highways of the respective States, they are no longer post-roads.
While they are post-roads, carriers of the mail use them under the
same conditions as the respective States have imposed on their own
citizens. In a case in the Western District of this Circuit, the
Court was of opinion that the act of Congress making all railroads
post-routes, applied only to railroads laid out and constructed conformably to the legislation of the respective States. A.subsequent
act of Congress had enacted that certain roads, including a designated railroad, should "be established as post-roads," and declared
this railroad a post-route. The road was in a route unauthorized
by the legislative charter of the company which constructed it. The
Court was of opinion that these acts of Congress had not made it a
lawful highway. (Cleveland, P. and A. B. B. Co. vs. Franklin
Canal Co., Pittsb. Leg. Journ. 24 Dec., 1853; see 10 Stat. U.S. 250;
9 Harris, 123.) An act of Congress declaring the Wheeling bridge,
as it had been constructed at a particular elevation, an established
post-road, required steamers navigating the river to adapt the height
of their chimneys to this elevation of the bridge. This provision as
to steamers, though considered by the Supreme Court a constitutional exercise of the power to regulate commerce between the
States, was not sustained as an execution of the power to establish
post-roads. (18 How. 431.) The post-office law authorizes the Postmaster-General to " direct the route or road, where there are more
than one, between places designated by law for a post-road," and
enacts that the road thus designated "shall be considered the postroad." But though there is only one road in a prescribed mailroute, he cannot, when the road is, from physical obstructions or
want of repair, impassable, adopt measures to render it serviceable.
The same law requires him in any such case " to report" the fact
"to Congress, with such information as can be obtained to enable
Congress to establish some other road instead of it, in the same main
direction."
But, the highways of a State, so long as open to the common
public use of her own citizens, may be used unobstructedly by carriers of the mail, and cannot be used by private carriers of mailable
matter in any mode which has been prohibited by Congress.
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In quoting prohibitory statutes which have created or secured the
postal monopoly, their penal provisions, their exemptions of letters
carried by special messengers, or of letters carried in a vessel relating to her cargo, and other such particular exceptions, will not
be mentioned.
The post-office law of 1825, sec. 19, enacts that no stage or other
vehicle, which regularly performs trips on a post-road, or on a road
parallel to it, and no packet-boat or other vessel which regularly
plies on a water declared a post-road, shall convey letters. This
enactment had, in the post-office acts of 1794, 1799, and 1810, been
combined with a prohibition of private foot or horse posts on postroads. But the act of 1825 repealed all prior postal statutes, without re-enacting this prohibition. The right of establishing such
private posts existed, therefore, from its 4ate until an amendatory
act of 2d March, 1827, revived the prohibition.
This law of 1827, sec. 8, enacts that no person other than- the
Postmaster-General, or his authorized agents, shall set up any foot
or horse post for the conveyance of letters and packets upon any
post-road, which is or may be established as such by law.
Increased facilities, afforded by steamers and rail cars, afterwards
enabled a private letter carrier, traveling in them as a passenger, to
transport packages, containing letters and other mailable matter, as
his baggage or as freight. The conveyances which he thus used
passed regularly over post-roads, and often carried the mails for the
post-office department. But they had not been set up, and were
not specially maintained as posts. The means by which he carried
on the business were ordinarily designated as expresses. The Postmaster-General's annual report of 2d December, 1843, stated that
numerous private posts, under the name of expresses, had sprung
within a few years into existence, extending themselves over the
mail-routes between the principal cities and towns, and transporting
letters and other mailable matter, for pay, to a great extent. This
report had been preceded by opinions of two successive AttorneyGenerals, upon the effect of the laws which have been quoted. One
of these opinions was particularly upon the question of the liability
of carriers of such expresses, under the existing laws. (Opin. Att.
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Gen. iv., 159, 276.) In the years 1843 and 1844, suits upon these
laws, for penalties, were prosecuted by the .United States in the
District Courts for both districts of New York, the Massachusetts
District, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Maryland, and
perhaps other districts. The defendants were in some cases the
principal carriers, whose conveyances were used. In other cases
the suits were against the carriers of the expresses themselves.
Except in Pennsylvania, and in Maryland, the prosecutions were
unsuccessful. The questions, and the points decided in other districts, were very clearly stated in a written opinion of Judge Randall, which was published in the Philadelphia Ledger of 9th October,
1844. It appears, from the Postmaster-General's annual report of
25th November, 1844, that the government had been unable to
suppress the private expresses, which were still continued "upon
the leading post-routes." In this, and in the former annual report,
he recommended legislation by Congress for their suppression.
Sections 9 to 12 inclusive of an act of 3d March, 1845, were
intended for this purpose. The 9th section enacts that it shall not
be lawful to establish any private express, or expresses, for the conveyance, or in any manner to cause to be conveyed, or provide for
the conveyance or transportation by regular trips, or at stated
periods or intervals, from one city, town, or other place, to any
other city, town, or place in the United States, between and from
and to which cities, towns, or other places, the United States mail
is regularly transported under the authority of the post-office department, of any letters, packets, or packages of letters or other
matter properly transmittable in the United States mail, except
newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and periodicals. The 10th section dnacts that it shall not be lawful for any stage coach, railroad
car, steamboat, packet boat, or other vehicle or vessel, or any of
the owners, managers, servants, or crews of either, which regularly performs trips, at stated periods, on a post-route, or between
two or more cities, towns, or other places, from one to the other of
which the United States mail is regularly conveyed under the anthority of the post-office department, to transport or convey any
letter or letters, packet or packages of letters, or other mailable
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matter, otherwise than in the mail. The 11th section makes it
penal for the owner of a stage coach, railroad car, steamboat, or
other vehicle or vessel, to convey or transport any person acting or
employed as z private express for the prohibited conveyance of
mailable matter; and the 12th section imposes a penalty for the
transmission of any such matter by any prohibited means, or for
the.depositing of it for the purpose of being transported by any
such means.
The purpose of these prohibitory statutes was thus to secure to
the United States a monopoly of the carriage of letters and mailable
packets on mail-routes.
Public streets, intersecting a municipal town, are, as highways,
distinguishable, specifically, from the general public highways of a
State beyond the town limits. The streets are, in'deed, as thoroughfares, general public highways of the State. But, independently of this character of thoroughfares, the streets are specially
local highways of the town. Internal affairs of municipal towns,
affecting their local interests alone, are always regulated more or
less by their local governments. These governments are administered in subordination to the paramount authority of the government of the State in which the towns are situated. But, in the
legislation of the paramount government affecting local interests of
such municipalities, the burdens, necessities, and future welfare of
their inhabitants are always to be considered. In the United States
the power of uncontrolled legislation on such subjects is exercisable
by the several States. They are subjects over which the States
have delegated no power of direct legislation to the government of
the United States. The streets within the limits of such towns
are made and repaired at the charge of the respective towns, or of
their inhabitants. The transaction of local business in such streets
may, to a greater or less extent, be regulated by local ordinances.
Internal regulations of police require especial adaptation to, and
observance and enforcement in, the streets. A street in a town is
within the sovereign dominion of the State, but not as a part of its
general public domain. It is a part of the special public domain,
as to which no just government can legislate with a disregard of
local rights and interests of inhabitants of the town.
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The public streets of a municipal town over which the mail may
be carried in any of the routes established by Congress as postroads, are, doubtless, post-roads for the passage of the mail. Whether streets of such a town can be established by Congress as
post-roads for any other purpose is questionable. The question
may not be one of constitutional power, but may concern only the
constitutional head under which the power is exercisable. So far
as the prohibition of private letter carrying within the limits of such
a town may be concerned, the legislative power which is wanting
under the head of post-roads, may, perhaps, be incidental to the
execution of the power to establish post-offices. If this be so, the
point may be of little ultimate practical importance. But its present
importance, from the particular language of the prohibitory and
other enactments of the' postal statutes in force, is not insignificant.
In some enactments of the postal statutes, the word post-office
designates-according to its primary meaning-a building, or
apartment, in which the postal business of a mail station is transacted. Thus, the act of 2d July, 1836, section 36, requires every
postmaster to reside in the city, or town, in which his office is
situated, or in the district of country which it usually supplies.
The word has also this meaning in the 17th and 6th sections of the
post-office act of 1825. These two sections contain the only prohibitory enactments by Congress, expressly securing the postal monopoly of the government, which have not already been cited. The
17th section, repeating enactments of prior laws of the United
States, which had been adopted from British statutes, provides that
no vessel arriving at any port where a post-office is established,
shall be permitted to report, enter, or break bulk, until all letters
directed to any person or persons in the United States, or their
territories, brought in her, under the care or control of her master
or commander, shall have been delivered to the postmaster. The
6th section requires every master, or manager of any steamboat,
passing from one port or place to another port or place where a
post-office is established, to deliver all letters and packets addressed
to, or destined for, such port, or place, to the post-master there;
and requires every person employed in any steamboat, to deliver
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every letter and packet of letters entrusted to him, to her master
or commander, before she shall touch at any port or place.
But, in postal statutes, the word post-office frequently has
another meaning. The postmasters are not, in any respect, carriers
of the mail. (7 Cranch, 267; 8 Watts, 453; Cowp. 764.) The
business of their offices includes many local arrangements in, and
near, their stations, or districts, which Congress, in executing the
power to establish them, has, necessarily, regulated. The word
post-office, as used in the statutes, therefore, frequently designates
a mail station, or the postal district of such a station. The station
may be a single detached house in which the post-office is kept. A
post-office may be in a village, or in a municipal town, small or
great. In the United States, a mere village is not, for postal purposes, usually distinguishable from such parts of the rural district
in which it is situated as contain only detached houses. But, where
the site of a post-office is a municipal town, the whole space within
its limits, beyond the walls of its post-office, is usually included
within the station ; and is, for many postal purposes, distinguishable from exterior spaces. Adjacent built spaces may be included
in the postal district of the town. If the corporate limits of the
town embrace unbuilt spaces, they may be excluded from its postal
district. But either the whole town, or its whole postal district,
may be, and usually is, a single postal station. Some postal statutes,
hereafter quoted, apply only to such sites of post-offices as are incorporated under the name of cities. Other statutes apply to cities
and other principal post-towns. The principal post-towns are distinguishable from those of secondary importance by a difference in
the methods of appointing the postmasters. Under the act of 2d
July, 1836, the President appoints them at places where the annual
commissions have amounted to $1,000. At other places they are
appointed, under the act of 3d March, 1825, by the PostmasterGeneral. Thus, New York, Philadelphia, and the other great cities,
and all other municipal towns, whether cities or not, at which the
respective postmasters are appointed by the President, may be
classed as principal post-towns. But, the primary general division
here, and in England, is into post-towns and rural districts. The
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Supreme Court of the United States has used the word post-town as
including, in a general sense, all spaces other than those designated
as rural. (1 Pet. 583 ; 2 Pet. 651.) The legal definition of a town
accords with such a general use of the word post-town. (Co. Litt.
115, 116.) Lord Mansfield, referring to the words, "any town or
place," in an English postal statute, said that they were used
because, at some stages, there was only a single house, but that the
whole of a town was considered as one spot, and referred to a prior
case, in which the court had "1considered the city of Gloucester as
the post-town or place in opposition to limits out of the town."
(Cowp. 188.)
The constitutional power of Congress may, perhaps, as to some
subjects which have been mentioned, be executed under the head of
either post-offices, or post-roads, or partly under the one head, and
partly under the other. But, of other subjects of the power, this
cannot be said. Under the head of post-roads, the power seems to
have been properly executed in designating highways for use in
mail routes, and in protecting and regulating such use. Under the
head of post-offices, the power is properly executed by establishing
mail stations, and regulating their postal business and its incidents.
According to this classification, a post for the carriage of letters
on a mail-route is distinguishable from a local post for their collection and carriage within the limits of a mail station. The former
has been called a general post. (Cowp. 188.) Such a post has
already been sufficiently described.
The local posts, of which, as yet, nothing has been said, are
special arrangements of comparatively modern origin. Their establishment has been preceded, perhaps, everywhere, by the employment of letter carriers for the local delivery of the contents of mails.
The business of such official carriers as thus deliver letters received
by mail may be combined with deliveries of drop letters. These,
in the language of the act of 3d March, 1845, sec. 1, are "letters
placed in any post-office not for transmission by mail, but for delivery
only." This twofold official business of the carriers employed for
the delivery of letters received at post-offices differs from that of
official carriers employed in the special collection and delivery of
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letters for a local post. The difference exists alike whether the
respective duties of the two employments are performed by different
persons, or, in whole or in part, by the same carridrs. The business
of letter carriers who deliver letters received at post-offices, including
drop letters, will be first considered. The special business of the
official carriers of the public local posts will, afterwards, be considered separately.
The business of a generalpost, consisting in the carriage of letters
and packets by mail, is completed by their delivery. In England,
a retention of them at the post-office of destination until they should
be calledfor, was not, in general, considered a delivery. (3 Wils.
453; Cowp. 182.) In general, therefore, no compensation for
delivering them elsewhere could be charged as an addition to the
statutory mail postage. Way letters were, to some extent, collected
and delivered by mail carriers on post-roads at points inconveniently
distant from any post town. This was probably done only in sparsely
peopled rural districts, in order to obviate the necessity for increasing the number of unproductive post-offices. (See Stat. 9 An. c. 10,
s. 33.) The persons to whom way letters were thus delivered paid
no more than the statutory mail postage. (3 Wils. 450, 451.) When
the post-office of a station was a single detached house in the, country, the deliveries were made at it, the letters remaining there .intil
called for. (Oowp. 182, 189.) This, probably, was the rule, or practice, at most, if not all, the rural stations. But, in the post-towns,
including London, the letters were deliverable, within the town
limits, at the houses of residence, or sojourn, or business, of the
respective persons to whom they were directed. They were thus
deliyerable in the town without any charge in addition to the mail
postage. But, the letters directed to persons beyond the town
limits were considered as deliverable at the post-office. These letters
might remain at the respective post-offices, therefore, until called
for. The postmasters, or letter carriers of the post-offices, who extended their deliveries beyond the respective town limits, were thus
at liberty to derive an emolument from this extension of the business. Persons beyond the town limits, who did not prefer calling
at the post-office, paid a compensation for the carriage of their
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letters in addition to the mail postage. English legislation of two
centuries ago indicates that this extension of the letter carrying
business was then a source of actual or expected profit. The same
legislation shows that a prohibition of private letter carrying within
the limits of a post-town was not then implied from an enactment
forbidding the carriage of letters by a foot or horse post, but, that
when the private carriage of letters within such a town was to be
prevented, it was forbidden by a distinct prohibition.
The Post-office Department in England was first permanently
organized in 1656, by an ordinance for which the act of 1660, (12
Car. 2. c. 35,) passed at the restoration, was a substitute. Of the
prior arrangements of the government with successive patentees and
farmers of the posts, the last had been a contract made by the
Council of State in 1653, confirmed by an ordinance of 1654, farming, for two years, the office of postmaster, foreign and inland, and
prescribing regulations of the office. It ordained that the farmer
should have the exclusive care and charge of the postage and carrizuge of all letters and packets foreign and inland from all persons,
and in all places, of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and to and from
all other places within the dominions of the commonwealth, that no
person other than himself and his deputies should set up any post,
or keep horses, or any packet boat, or boats, for the carrying or
sending of letters inland or foreign, and prohibited all posts. and
carriers post, to or from any town or place within the commonwealth
or its dominions not licensed by him or his deputies. This ordinance
did not prohibit private letter carrying otherwise than by post, but
prohibited private posting as fully as the acts of Congress of 1825
and 1827. The ordinance of 1656 secured the monopoly to the
Postmaster-General and his deputies by prohibitions which, though
somewhat amplified in expression, did not, in effect, extend beyond
those of the ordinance of 1654. But, the act of 1660 contained a
twofold prohibition, forbidding private letter carryirg as well as
private posting. It enacted that no person other than the Postmaster-General, and his deputies, should carry, recarry, and deliver
letters for hire, or set up or employ any foot.post, horse-post, coachpost or packet-boat whatever, for the conveying or carrying of any
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letters or packets by sea or land, within the dominions of the Crown.
It was provided that nothing in the act should be understood to prohibit the carrying or recarrying of any letters to or from any town
or place to or from the next respective post-road, or stage appointed
for that purpose, but that every person should have free liberty to
send and employ such persons for the purpose as he should think
fit. Thus, all private letter carrying, not included in this and other
particular exceptions, was prohibited. The contrast of the former
ordinances, and this act of 1660, shows that though, by the latter,
private letter carrying elsewhere than on mail routes was forbidden,
it was not included in the phrase private posting, or understood to
be forbidden by a prohibition of such posting. This was not less
indicated in the post-office act of 1710, which supplied that of 1660.
The modifications in the act of 1710 were especially consequent
upon the establishment of local posts which had been introduced in
the meantime.
The motive of extending the prohibition of private letter carrying
by the act of 1660, must have been to secure to the official letter
carriers of the post-towns an emolument from their deliveries beyond
the town limits. But, as the villages became towns, and the population of the towns increased, the spaces within which the postmasters were compe'lable to deliver letters, without any charge,
were extended. Their emoluments from the carriage of letters were
thus diminished as their burdensome duties were increased. In the
smaller post-towns, which were about four-fifths of the whole number in the kingdom, the postmasters declined making deliveries,
except at the respective post-offices, without an additional allowance.
(Cowp. 189, 186.) In 1768 it was decided that no postmaster could
lawfully demand an additional payment for delivering letters at
private houses in a post-town. (4 Burr. 2149; 5 Burr. 2711, 2709.)
But, the postmasters still insisted that the post-offices were the only
places at which they were bound by law to deliver letters, and that
persons unwilling to make the extra-payment could not require the
deliveries to be made at the respective places of their abode. In
this position, the postmasters appear to have been at one time sustained by the Postmaster-General. .5 Burr. 2710.) But the point
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was afterwards judicially decided in the Common Pleas in 1773,
and King's Bench in 1774, against this opinion. (3 Wils. 443, Cowp.
182.) The decisions were that, in all post-towns, the deliveries
must be made, for the mail postage only, at the respective private residences of all persons whose residences were known or could be found.
But the rule of decision was not applicable to letters for persons
residing beyond the town limits. After these decisions, the course
of business was to suffer letters for such persons to remain in the
post-offices until called for. (2 Smith, K. B., 404, 405.)
The general provisions of the English post-office acts of 1660
and 1710 were, in express terms, applicable to the colonies. While
the act of 1660 (12 Car. 2, c. 85) was in force, the office of Postmaster-General for the colonies was created, and its administration
aided by colonial legislation. The act of 1710 (9 An. c. 10) expressly authorized the establishment, with the approval of the English Postmaster-General, of a chief post-office in each colony. This
act was in force until the war of Independence. It was afterwards
consulted by those who drew the earlier postal statutes of the
United States, and was the source from which some provisions of
acts now in force were derived. But local reasons rendered many
of its regulations inapplicable in the colonies. Insuperable difficulties would have prevented any general organization of a system
of deliveries of letters in them except at post-offices.
The Congress of the United Colonies, in July, 1775, appointed a
Postmaster-General, under whose direction a line of posts was to
be established with cross-posts. The articles of confederation of
1778 gave to Congress the sole and exclusive right and power of
establishing and regulating post-offices from one State to another
throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the
papers passing through the same as might be requisite to defray
the expenses. The preamble and enactments of an ordinance of
18th October, 1782, regulating " the post-office of the United
States," indicate that the congress of the confederation defined its
own legislative power for postal purposes " throughout all the
United States," as if the article conferring it had not contained
the words "from one State to another," or as if these words had
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not been of restrictive import. As mail-routes within a State were
essential to a postal communication between the States, the words
could not have excluded the power of establishing such mail-routes.
This ordinance enacted that a continued communication of posts
should be established under prescribed regulations, and that the
Postmaster-General and his deputies, and no other person, should
have the receiving, dispatching, sending post, carrying, and delivering of any letters, packets, or other despatches, from any place
within the United States, for hire or profit, but that private crossposts might, with the consent of the Postmaster-General or his
deputy, be employed on any cross-road until a public rider could be
established on it. The first Congress under the present constitution
enacted, in 1789, a law for "the temporary establishment of the
post-office," authorizing the appointment of a Postmaster-General,
whose powers,. and the regulation of the post-office, were to be the
same as they last had been under the resolutions and ordinances of
the Congress under the former government. This law was annually
renewed until 1792, when it was temporarily supplied by "an act
to establish the post-office and post-roads within the United States,"
which was to remain in force for two years. The latter act was
altered and supplied on 8th May, 1794, by the first permanent post.
office law of the United States. As the act of 1794 was also the
first law of the United States which mentioned letter carriers at the
sites of post-offices, or drop-letters, its prohibitory enactments which
defined and secured the postal monopoly should be compared and
contrasted with those of the previous temporary act of 1792. The
law of 1792 (sec. 14) made it penal for any person other than the
Postmaster-General or his deputies, or persons by them employed,
to take up, receive, order, dispatch, convey, carry, or deliver any
letter or letters, packet or packets, other than newspapers, for hire
or reward, or to be concerned in setting up any foot or horse-post,
wagon or other carriage, by or in which any letter or packet should
be carried for hire or any established post-road, or any packet or
other vessel or boat, or any conveyance whatever, whereby the
revenue of the General Post-Office might be injured. The law of
1794 substituted for these prohibitions an enactment (sec. 14) which
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only prohibited any person other than the Postmaster-General or
his deputies, or persons by them employed, from being concerned
in setting up or maintaining any foot or horse-post, stage, wagon,
or other stage-carriage, on any established post-road, or any packet,
boat, or other vessel, to ply regularly from one place to another,
between which a regular communication by water should be established by the United States, and from receiving any letter or
packet other than newspapers, magazines, or pamphlets, and carrying the same by such foot or horse-post, stage, wagon, or other stagecarriage, packet, boat, or vessel. The exception as to newspapers,
&c., is no longer in force. In other respects, the prohibitions of
this act of 1794 were the same as those in the acts of 1825 and
1827, now in force, which have been quoted.
The act of 1794 (sec. 28) authorized the employment at such
post-offices, as the Postmaster-General should direct, of carriers for
the delivery of letters at the places respectively where such postoffices were established, except letters to persons who might, in
writing, request them to be detained in the post-office. The act
allowed a certain compensation to the carriers for the delivery of
every letter received by post, and ascertained the postmaster's compensation for every drop-letter. These enactments were repeated
in the laws of 1799 and 1810, and, with a slight verbal alteration, in
the act of 3d March, 1825, the provisions of which section, except
that the letter carriers' compensation has been reduced, are now in
force.
Thus, the business of the carriers who deliver letters received at
the post-office of a mail station, is not regulated, in the United
States, as it was in England at the date of their independence.
But, notwithstanding the differences of the regulations in the two
countries, the towns which include the respective districts of such
letter carriers are, in the United States, for postal purposes, not
less than in England, single places. We have seen that, in England, the business of such letter carriers in a post-town was not
that of a distinct independent post. The differences of regulation
in the United States do not bring this business, as a separate one,
within the statutory definition of a carriage by post. If this had
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not already been shown, it would be proved by the description of a
drop letter in the acts of 1794, 1799, 1810, and 1825. Such a
letter is described in them as one "lodged at any.post-office 'not to
be carried by post, but to be delivered at the place where it is so
lodged." That carriage by post here meant carriage by mail, appears from the language in which this definition of a drop letter was
repeated in the passage already cited from the act of 1845.
No act of Congress, hitherto quoted, indicates, on the part of the
government of the United States, a purpose to monopolize the local
business of letter carrying in a post-town. On the contrary, the
omission in the act of 1794, and in the subsequent legislation, of
every word used in any prior statute on either side of the Atlantic
which could possibly have been thought applicable to such letter
carrying, as distinguished from private letter carrying on mailroutes, proves that Congress intended to prohibit the latter business
only. The letter carriers of the post-offices in towns would have
had no motive to desire any prohibitory statute for their protection,
if drop letters had not been included in their deliveries. Their
superior facilities of access, in the post-offices, to the contents of
the mails, would have secured the priority of their deliveries over
those of private carriers calling there for letters. Through this priority, the official carriers would have had a practical monopoly, so
long as the service of a competent number of them was properly
performed at reasonable rates of charge.

Local posts will next be considered. These, as has already been
observed, are special arrangements for the carriage of letters and
packets to and from subordinate stations within the limits of a mail
station. Such special posts, private or public, become necessary
when the buildings of a populous mail station cover an extensive
space. The business of such posts, when transacted by a government, is altogether independent of the reception or delivery of the
contents of the mails. A government which monopolizes the business of letter carrying in a populous post-town, must establish such
a system of postal stations within the town lim*.ts. A government
which does not monopolize the business within the town, may, also,
11
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for the accommodation of its inhabitants, establish such a system of
internal posts. This may be done by an extension of the drop letter
system, through arrangements for a subsidiary collection, by postal
officials, of letters and packets, at convenient points of reception or
deposit within the town, beyond the walls of its post-office. When
other offices are established for this purpose at any of the subordinate stations, they are called sub, or branch, post-offices. Though
the primary receptacles of the letters are not offices, but mere appointed places of deposit, the local collection and carriage of the
letters is a species of post.
The word post-office, when used, without any qualification, designates not a branch post-office, but a post-office at which mails arrive.
So, the word post used without qualification, express or implied,
signifies a general post, and not a mere local post within the limits
of a mail station. But the relation, or context, of the word post,
may so qualify it as to show that a special or local post is intended
where no qualification is otherwise expressed.
In England, the type of such a post is the penny post of London.
This post was first established while the above quoted prohibitory
enactments of the English post-office law of 1660 were in force.
It originated in a private post established within the city, and the
built suburbs, by letter carriers, whose business was conducted without the sanction of the post-office department. The prohibitory
provisions of the act of 1660 enabled the department to suppress
the business as a private enterprise. It was taken out of the hands
of its projector into the management of the government; but he
received a compensation from the government. A subsequent private undertaking of the same kind, called the half-penny post, was
also suppressed by the government while the act of 1660 was in
force. This act contained nothing which expressly sanctioned the
charge by the government of a penny upon every letter and packet
carried by this post. But, as no such service was prescribed by the
act, the charge, when the service was performed, was, perhaps, not
unlawful. The post-office law of 1710 contained enactments which
indicate, however, that some doubt may have existed as to the lawfulness of this charge, and also some doubt of even the sufficiency
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of the prohibitions in the act of 1660, to prevent private letter carrying within the limits of a post-town. The act of 1710, among
the prescribed rates of postage, included one penny upon every letter and packet passing or repassing by the carriage called the penny
post, established and settled within the cities of London and Westminster, and borough of Southwark, and parts adjacent, and to be
received and delivered within ten miles from the general post-office
in London. This act prohibited all persons other than the Postmaster-General, or his deputies, from receiving, dispatching, conveying, carrying, recarrying, or delivering, any letters or packets,
or making any collection of letters, or setting up, or employing any
foot-post, horse-post, or packet boat, or other vessel or boat, or other
person or persons, or conveyance, for the receiving, ,dispatching,
conveying, carrying, recarrying, or delivering, any letters or packets,
by sea or by land, or on any river, within the dominions of the crown,
or by means whereof the same should be done. But nothing in the
act was to be understood to prohibit the carrying or recarrying of any
letters or packets to or from any town, or place, to or from the next
respective post-road, or appointed stage, above six miles from the
general post-office in London, or the chief offices of Edinburgh and
Dublin ; and every person was to have liberty to send and employ such
persons for the purpose as he should think fit; provided that nothing
therein contained should authorize any collection of letters to be
made in or near London, or the suburbs, under pretence of conveying the same to any parts or places in the city, or suburbs, or to the
general post-office of London, without the license of the PostmasterGeneral. The limits of the business of the penny post were enlarged in 1732 by the statute 4 G. 2. c. 33. This act authorized
the charge of an additional penny for deliveries beyond the former
limits. These former limits were afterwards understood to include
all such suburbs as had been covered with rows of contiguous buildings in 1710. (Cowp. 624.) The opinion which seems to have been
afterwards entertained was, that the Postmaster-General could not,
without further legislative authority, establish such a post in any
other town, on such a footing as to be secure against competition
with private letter carriers. This appears from a statute of 1765,
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(5 G. 3.c. 25, sects. 11 and 12,) which authorized him to establish
an office, to be called The Penny Post-Office, in any city or town,
and the suburbs thereof, and places adjacent, in Great Britain and
Ireland, and the British dominions in America, and to demand and
receive the same rates for the postage of letters and packets conveyed by such penny post as were, or might be, taken for the carriage of letters and packets by the penny post established in the
cities of London and Westminster, and borough of Southwark, and
parts adjacent, according to the extent and meaning of the acts of
1710 and 1782, and of this act ; and that, when such penny postoffice, or offices, should be established, no person should, without the
Postmaster-General's license, make any collection of letters or
packets, in or near such city, town, suburbs, or places where the same
should be established.
If any measures, under this authority, were adopted by the British government before the Declaration of Independence, for the
establishment of a penny post any where within the present limits
of the United States, no such measure was carried permanently
into execution. The review of the English statutes on the subject
has been thought necessary, because they are legislative precedents
indicating that a mere authority to establish a penny post of the
government in a town does not imply that, when it is established,
private letter carrying in the town is prohibited. They indicate
also that something more than a general enactment forbidding
private posting is required in order to prohibit private letter carrying within the limits of a local post.
The first in date of the acts of Congress of the United States
-which expressly sanctioned the establishment of local public posts
within the limits of mail stations was the act of 2d July, 1836. This
act, sect. 41, authorizes the Postmaster-General, whenever proper
for the accommodation of the public in any city, to employ letter
carriers for the delivery of letters received at the post-office in the
said city, except letters for persons who may, in writing, have requested them to be retained in the post-office, "and for the receipt
of letters at such places in the said city as the Postmaster-General
may direct, and for the deposit of the same in the post-offlce." The
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provisions of this enactment concerning the employment of carriers
of letters received at the post-office, were, in effect, a repetition of
the provisions of the act of 1825 on that subject. They must have
been introduced in order to preclude any implication of an intention
to change the prior system of delivery of such letters. The only
part of the act of 1836 which concerns the subject of present consideration was the authority to employ carriers for the primary
receipt of letters at places other than the post-offices of the respective cities. Before arrangements of this kind were thus expressly
authorized by this act, they had been, to some extent, made by the
postmasters at one or more cities. The second section of an act of
18th May, 1842, required the "postmasters at New York, Boston,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Orleans, and the other several
cities of the Union" to account thereafter for all emoluments or
sums received for boxes, or pigeon holes, or other receptacles for
letters or papers, or for the delivery of letters or papers at orfrom
any place in either of the said cities other than the actual post-office
of such city, and for all emoluments, receipts, and profits, from
keeping branch post-offices in either of the said cities. An act of
3d March, 1847, authorizes and directs the Postmaster-General to
establish, when, in his judgment, the public interest or convenience
requires it, one or more branch post-offices, to facilitate the operations of the post-office in any city orplace which, in his opinion,
may require such additional accommodation for the convenience of
the inhabitants; and makes it his duty to prescribe regulations for
such branch post-offices, and provides that no additional postage
shall be charged for the receipt or delivery of any letter or packet
at any branch post-office. A law of 3d March, 1851, sect. 10,
enacts "that it shall be in the power of the Postmaster-General at
all post-offices where the postmasters are appointed by the President
of the United States, to establish post-routes within the cities or
towns, to provide for conveying letters to the post-office by establishing suitable and convenient places of deposit, and by employing
carriers to receive and deposit them in the post-office; and at all
such offices it shall be in his power to cause letters to be delivered
by suitable carriers to be appointed by him for that purpose." And
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an act of 15th June, 1860, has authorized the Postmaster-General
to establish boxes for the delivery of letters at the outside stations
in the suburbs of cities if it can be done without loss to the department or injury to the service.
Under the respective authorities conferred by the laws which
have been mentioned, branch post-offices have been established in
the city of Philadelphia, and also boxes for the reception of letters
and packets at other places in the streets of the city. As the postal
business within the station has been regulated, the letters and
packets received in these branch offices, and in the boxes throughout the city, are collected and carried to the Philadelphia postoffice.
In the five enactments which have been quoted as authorizing or
sanctioning the establishment of posts within the limits of mail
stations, we find no prohibition of the business of private letter carriers within such limits. Congress has, on the contrary, omitted
to insert the prohibitions of which legislative precedents would have
suggested the adoption, if it had been intended to forbid such business. Of the five enactments, none except those of 1847 and 1851,
apply to any mail station whose municipal character is not that of
a city. The act of 1847 applies to places not of this character so
far as the words "any city or place" can thus determine its application. But this act authorizes no specific arrangement of a local
post except through subsidiarypost-offices. We have seen that such
offices are not the only primary receptacles of letters at the internal
stations of such a post. The act of 1851, which applies to every
principal post town, whether a city or not, authorizes the establishment of a more extended and more complete system of local posts ;
and specifies the intended subjects of its arrangements in detail.
We have seen that a monopoly by the government of letter carrying, at the sites of the local posts, is not an essential part of such a
system.
The "post-routes," which this tenth section of the act of 1851
authorizes the Postmaster-General to establish in the respective
towns or cities are thus local posts to and from interior subordinate stations of the cities or towns. The definition of them is thus
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distinctly given in the act itself, which designates them as "postroutes within the cities or towns." If any other meaning of the
word post-routes was intended by the draftsman of the act, the
latent intention is not expressed so that effect can be given to it.
The special post-route8 defined in the act are thus different from
such mail-routes, used by general posts, as are called, in a more
general sense, post-routes. Unless the word "post-route" is isolated,
and its context and relation disregarded, this general meaning is not
attributable to it, as it is used in the act.
But, at the Post-office Department, the general meaning has been
attributed to it, and it has been considered synonymous with postroads. The Postmaster-General issued, on 17th July, 1860, an
order, to take effect on 1st August, 1860, declaring that, under
the authority conferred by the act of 1851, the streets and other
public avenues in certain designated parts of the city of Philadelphia "are established as post-roads."
Post-route and post-road are not properly synonymous even
'when applicable to the carriage of a mail to and from appointed
postal stations. A post-route, in this general sense of the word. is
the appointed course, or prescribed line of transportation of the
mail. Post-roads are, as we have seen, the highways, or public
passages, on which it is transported in such a route. In the postal
statutes the words post-route and post-road have, therefore, sometimes, distinguishable meanings. Their meanings may be practically different. (See 9 Harris, 127.) Nevertheless, the distinction
has not always been observed. The words post-route and post-road
have, sometimes, in the postal statutes, the same signification. Of
the instances in which this occurs, one, in particular, will be mentioned. The act of 7th July, 1838, section 2, contains the words:
"Each and every railroad within the limits of the United States
"which now is or hereafter may be made and completed, shall be
"a post-route; and the Postmaster-General shall cause the mail to
"be transported thereon, provided he can have it done upon reason"able terms," &c.; and the act of 25th July, 1839, provides that
he shall not, under this authority, allow more than a certain rate of
compensation to railroad companies for the conveyance of the mails
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their roads."

Here the railroads were to be used in the

routes of general posts, to and from appointed mail stations. If
such mail-routes had likewise been the subject of the 10th section of
the act of 1851, the word post-routes, as used in it, might have been
understood as having likewise the meaning of post-roade. But the
interior local posts of a town, and not such general posts, are the
subject of this enactment. We think, therefore, that the word postroutes is used in it in a special sense in which it is not synonymous
with post-roads, and that the latter word is, consequently, misapplied in the Postmaster-General's order.
The bill, after setting out this order, complains that the defendants, without the authority of the United States, have set up, and
now continue a foot-post and a horse-post for the conveyance of letters and packets over the streets and other avenues in the parts of
the city designated in the order, and are engaged in carrying and
delivering such letters and packets for hire or compensation within
these limits. The defendants having demurred to the bill, admit
the truth of these allegations. The argument for the United States
is that the word post-routes is, in the act of 1851, synonymous with
post-roads, that the Postmaster-General's order has, therefore, under
the authority conferred by this act, made the streets in question
post-roads, and that, consequently, the act of 1827 prohibits the
business of the defendants as that of carriers of letters and packets,
by post, on such roads.
For the reasons which have been stated, we do not think that this
interpretation of the act of 1851 can be sustained, or that the defendants are letter carriers by any such post as the act of 1827 prohibits. We think that the act of 1827 applies only to private posts
on mail-routes, and that the act of 1851 does not apply to such
routes.
The bill further complains, and the demurrer admits, that the
defendants, without the authority of the United States, have established and now continue in use a private express, for the conveyance or transportation, for hire or compensation, of letters and packets, other than newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and periodicals, by
regular trips, and at stated periods or intervals, from various places
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within the City of Philadelphia to various other places in the city
within and between the postal districts of the city, over the streets,
avenues, and other highways of the city. These allegations are copied
from the ninth section of the Act of 1845, which has already been
fully set forth. "Cities, towns, or other places" are mentioned in
it. Upon these words the'argument for the United States is, that
private expresses between "places" within the postal district of a
city or other town are prohibited. We have seen, that the purpose
which induced this legislation of 1845 was to prohibit private expresses on mail-routes. A legislative enactment may, however, extend beyond, as it may fall short of, the purpose of its draftsman.
In its interpretation the question to be decided is,.not what he may
have intended, but what its words mean. The enactment now in
question preceded the Acts of 1847 and 1851-the latter of which
was the first authority for the establishment of an extended system
of local posts in towns. But the prior act of 1842 had recognized
the existence of branch post-offices in cities, and the act' of 1836
had authorized the reception of letters, in cities, for the respective
post-offices at designated places beyond their walls. Therefore, it
is not impossible that Congress might have intended, in 1845, to
prohibit private letter-carrying within the limits of cities in which
such internal posts are established. The question consequently
may be considered as if the acts of 1847 and 1851 had preceded
the act of 1845. This gives the utmost effect possible to the argument for the United States. But the argument, with all this aid,
cannot be sustained. Where "cities, towns, or other places" are
mentioned in the act, the word places designates mail-stations
which are neither cities nor towns. But no "places" other than
mail-stations are designated. Points within, the limits of a mailstation or postal district are not within the meaning of the word
."places," as used in the act. In the statute already mentioned as
having been quoted by Lord Mansfield, the word "place" in a similar context thus had the meaning of postal-station. (Cowp. 188.)
It has had a like meaning in other English and American Acts of
Legislation, which have been mentioned. The word has had this
precise meaning also in a judicial statement of the methods of giv-
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ing notice of the dishonor of negotiable paper, personally or by
post, "when the parties reside in the same city or place," and
when the party to be served "resides in a different place or city."
(11 Johns. 232.) In the Act of Congress now in question, the
whole import of the context and the particular import and application of certain words which might be quoted and commented upon,
thus define the word "places."
Thus, the business in which the defendants, 'as letter-carriers,
are engaged, is neither a private post within the meaning of the
act of 1827, nor a private express within the act of 1845. The
continuance of their business has a tendency to reduce the postal
profits of the government or of its officials, by diminishing the
number of letters received officially for local delivery. But this
does not render the business unlawful, unless it is prohibited by
the statutes which create or secure the postal monopoly of the government. The question is,. not whether the business could constitutionally have been prevented or suppressed, but whether it has
been legislatively prohibited. Though a local post, with subordinate stations, has been established in a post-town, the statutes in
force do not, in our opinion, prohibit the business of private lettercarriers within the limits of the town.
Hitherto, the case has been considered as if the business of the
defendants was confined to the carriage of such letters and packets
as officials of the government could carry only on routes of the local
post established within the limits of the Philadelphia mail station.
If the business of the defendants, as described in the bill, were
confined to the carriage of such letters, the demurrer, in its present
form, would be sustained, and the bill dismissed. But, the bill contains other allegations. The Legislature of Pennsylvania, by an
act of 2d February, 1854, incorporated newly the city of Philadelphia, with an enlargement of its boundaries, which now embrace
the whole of the former county of Philadelphia, including extensive
rural spaces beyond the limits of the former city and of the adjacent built districts. Within this enlarged municipality are many
mail-stations, every one of them having its post-office, which is
neither a sub nor a branch office. The built and rural districts of
the city are intersected by streets which, so far as used betwe
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these offices by the general posts, are, of course, mail-routes. The
parts of the city designated in the Postmaster-General's order include several of the mail stations and certain rural spaces. The
bill, referring to the act of the State legislature incorporating the
new city, names the several mail stations within its limits, and contains allegations importing that the defendants carry, not only such
letters as have been specifically mentioned, but also letters which
general posts of the government might carry on the streets in
question, as established post-roads between such mail stations. The
defendants, if engaged in carrying letters or packets which might
otherwise be thus carried by mail, violate the prohibition in the act
of 1827. This prohibition is thus, however, independent altogether
of the Postmaster-General's order of July, 1860, and of any act of
Congress passed since 1827. So far as the bill may have this import, the demurrer cannot be sustained. A demurrer to so much
of the bill as is not of this import would, however, have been sustainable. A demurrer thus framed would, perhaps, as my be inferred
from the course of the argument, cover the whole intended subject of
controversy. An application to amend the demurrer, or to take it
off the file and demur again, may, therefore, be entertained. (See
2 Sch. & Lef. 207; 4 Madd. 192, 207, 208.) The case will stand
over that the defendants may have an opportunity to make such an
application.
In the United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Ohio.
November Term, 1860. In Chancery.
EBER B. WARD ET AL. VS. PHILO CHAMBERLIN ET AL.
1. Decrees in the Admiralty can only be enforced in the Courts of the United States,
in the mode and by the process properly ordained by Acts of Congress and Rules
of Court for their execution.
2. The,character and effect of such Decrees in Admiralty, and their modes of execution, are within the province of Congress to determine.
3. Under the existing Acts of Congress and Rules of Court, the libellant in Admiralty may have an attachment or a capias against the person of the defendant,
or a fieri facias against his goods and chattels; and these are the only writs and
the only mode prescribed, whereby an Admiralty decree can be lawfully executed
in the Circuit and District Courts.
4. The Court of Admiralty has no power to issue an execution against the lands of
a defendant, to collect the amount due on a decree in Admiralty, for the payment
of money.
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5. The Supreme Court of the United States has power to regulate the practice of
the Courts of Admiralty, and to frame rules in relation to executions and other
process to be used therein.
6. An Admiralty Decree is not a lien on land, and has never been treated as a lien on
land in either England or this country.
7. A Court of Equity will grant discovery and general relief in a case where a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had at law: hence, when an execution
had been issued, and no property found on which to levy, a judgment creditor
may file his bill for relief, and is entitled to the aid of the Court, to discover and
apply the debtor's property to the payment of the judgment.

Hon. John M'Lean, Associate Judge of Supreme Court.
Bon. Hiram V. Willson, District Judge.
The facts in the case, and the questions of law involved, are fully
stated in the following opinion of
WILLSON, J.-Several important and novel questions of law
are presented for our consideration in this case. They arise on a
demurrer to the complainants' bill, interposed by Philo Chamberlin,
one of the defendants.
Upon some of these questions, the members of this court entertain
conflicting opinions. But this conflict of opinion is, perhaps, not
to be regretted, since, by certifying the points of difference, the
parties will be enabled to take the case at once to the Supreme Court,
and there obtain a final settlement of the questions of law which it
involves.
In differing from the learned presiding judge, it is but just to
myself to state the reasons in support of my own conclusions.
The facts in the case are correctly set forth in the abstract of the
bill furnished by the counsel for complainants.
On the 12th of November, 1856, the complainants obtained a
decree in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of Ohio, against two of the defendants, Chamberlin and
Crawford. The suit was a proceeding in admiralty for damages
sustained by the libellants in the loss of the steamer Atlantic by a
collision with the propeller Ogdensburgh, a vessel owned by said
defendants. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and the decree of the Circuit Court was there affirmed.
On the 7th of July, 1859, by agreement of the parties, a joint
decree was entered in the Circuit Court (on a mandate from the
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Supreme Court) against Chamberlin and Crawford and their sureties,
in the appeal to the Supreme Court.
This decree provided, that if certain payments should be made by
the original defendants, at defined periods, then no execution should
issue on the decree ; but in default of such payments being made, the
complainants were authorized to proceed and collect the amount due
as they should see fit.
Two payments were made as required by the decree, and it is
averred that two defaults bad occurred previous to the filing of the
bill in this case, and that the complainants have caused execution
to issue upon said decree, against the goods and chattels, lands and
tenements of the defendants in said decree ; that the marshal found
no goods or chattels whereon to levy, and that for the want of such
goods and chattels, he levied on the lands and tenements of said
defendants, described in the bill, and situate in the Northern District of Ohio.
The other defendants, it is alleged, claim rights in and liens upon
said land, the nature and extent of which they are called upon to
disclose.
It is also averred in the bill, that said defendants in said decree
have no goods or chattels liable to execution, and no lands or tenements in the State of Ohio, other than those described as levied
upon by the marshal.
The prayer of the bill is for a discovery, and for an adjustment
of liens upon and of claims of certain of the defendants in the land;
and also for a sale of the several parcels of real estate levied upon,
and the proceeds applied in payment of the amount due on said
decree. There is also a prayer for general relief.
A portion of the defendants claiming liens upon the land have
answered, disclosing their several interests in the property.
But the questions of law which we are now called upon to decide,
arise upon the demurrer to the complainants' bill.
The cause of demurrer'is placed on two grounds. 1st. That the
Courts of the United States, in the exercise of admiralty powers,
have no authority to issue executions against lands upon decrees in
admiralty.
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2d. That the facts, as set forth in the bill, do not, in a Court of
Chancery, entitle the complainants to the general relief prayed for.
The authority by which the Federal Courts are empowered to
issue executions upon decrees in admiralty, is to be found in the
various acts of Congress relating to process, and in the xules of practice, prescribed by the Supreme Court for the government of the
Circuit and District Courts of the United States.
It, therefore, becomes necessary to refer to and carefully examine
those acts of Congress, and those rules of admiralty practice, in order
to determine the first question raised by the demurrer.
By the 14th section of the judiciary act of 1789, the courts of
the United States are empowered to issue all other writs not specially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law; 1 U. S. Stat. 81.
The second section of the process act of 1789 provides, that the
" writs and executions," in causes of equity and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to the course of the civil law;
1 U. S. Stat. 93.
The second section of the process act of 1792 declares, that the
forms of writs, executions, and other process in courts of equity, and
courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to
the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity,
and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistinguished from
courts of common law, except so far as may have been provided for
by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, subject, however, to such alterations and additions as the said courts
shall, in their discretion, deem expedient, or to such regulations as
the Supreme Court of the United States shall think proper, from
time to time, by rule, to prescribe to any circuit or district court
concerning the same; 1 U. S. Stat. 275.
By the act of May 19th, 1828, (which has application to the Federal courts in States admitted into the Union since the 29th day of
September, 1789,) it is provided, that proceedings in suits in courts
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction shall be according to the
principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of admiralty as
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contradistinguished from courts of common law: subject, however,
to such alterations and additions as the said courts shall, in their
discretion, deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme
Court of the United States shall think proper, from time to time,
by rules, to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning
the same.
And by the third section of the same law it is further provided,
that "writs of execution and other final process issued on judgments
and decrees, rendered in any of the Courts of the United States,
and the proceedings thereupon shall be the same, except their style,
in each State respectively as are now used in the courts of such
State, saving to the courts of the United States in which there are
not courts of equity, with the ordinary equity jurisdiction, the
power of prescribing the mode of executing their decrees in equity
by rules of court: Provided, however, that it shall be in the power
of the courts, if they see fit, in their discretion, by rules of court, so
far to alter final process in said courts as to conform the same to
any change which may be adopted by the legislatures of the respective States for the State Courts ;" 4 Stat. U. S.278.
The act of August 23d, 1842 (further supplementary to the judiciary act of 1789) declares, that the Supreme Court shall have fall
power and authority, from time to time, to prescribe and regulate
and alter the forms of writs and other process to be used and issued
in the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, in suits at
common law, or in admiralty, and in equity, pending in the said
courts, and generally to regulate the whole practice of said courts;
5 U. S. Stat., 516.
In pursuance of the power and authority granted by this act of
Congress, the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1845, adopted
and promulgated a set of rules for the government of the Federal
courts in admiralty proceedings. The rule regulating final process
upon decrees for the payment of money, reads as follows:
Rule 21.
"In all cases where the decree is for the payment of money, the
libellant may., at his election, have an attachment to compel the defendant to perform the decree, or a writ of execution in the niature

WARD ET AL. vs. CHAMBERLIN ET AL.

of a capias and of a fieri facias, commanding the marshal or his
deputy to levy the amount thereof of the goods and chattels of the
defendant, and, for want thereof, to arrest his body to answer the
exigency of the execution."
"In all other cases the decree may be enforced by an attachment
to compel the defendant to perform the decree, and upon such attachment, the defendant may be arrested and committed to prison
until he performs the decree, or is otherwise discharged by law, or
by order of the court."
It is insisted, by the counsel for the defendant, that the foregoing
rule, taken in connection with the act of August 23d, 1842, is fully
equivalent to an enactment by Congress, regulating final process in
admiralty on decrees for the payment of money; and that the legislation of the different States, and the practice of the State courts,
in matters of law and equity, have no bearing upon the subject;
and, further, that as there is no act of Congress expressly making
lands liable to execution upon admirality decrees, and as it is not in
accordance with long-established usage in the High Court of Admiralty, in England, to issue executions against lands on its decrees;
for these reasons it is urged that the act of Congress of May 19,
1828, should not be so interpreted as to conflict with the true intent
of the twenty-first rule of admiralty practice, but that said rule
should be regarded as designed to cover the whole subject, and as
alone containing the present regulation, respecting the execution of
admiralty decrees in the Circuit and District Courts of the United
States.
On the contrary, it is insisted, by the counsel for the complainants, that by the 4th section of the act of Congress of July 4th,
1840, 5 Stat. U. S.392, decrees in admiralty are, by fair implication, made liens upon the real estate of the parties against whom
they are rendered ; and the like effect (as to admiralty decrees) is
claimed to exist under the act of 1828, in virtue of State laws.
Hence it is urged that the lien of admiralty decrees, in the courts
of the United States, is a legal right attaching to land, and is, therefore, a rule of property arising under the laws of the several States,
and cannot be abrogated by a rile of the Supreme Court.
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The language employed in framing the twenty-first rule of admiralty practice, leaves no room to doubt the real and true purpose of
its authors.
"In all cases where the decree is for the payment of money, the
libellant may, at his election, have an attachment to compel the defendant to perform the decree, or a writ of execution in the nature
of a capias and of a fieri facias commanding the marshal to levy
the amount thereof of the goods and chattels of the defendant, and
for want thereof to arrest his body to answer the exigency of the
execution."
Decrees in courts of admiralty can only be enforced in the mode
and by the process properly ordained for their execution. The
character and effect of such decrees, and the mode of their execution, is, unquestionably, within the province of Congress to determine.
]By the act of 1842, Congress determined and declared, that the
Supreme Court should have full power and authority to prescribe
and regulate and alter the forms of writs and otherprocess to be
used and issued in the District and Circait Courts of the United
States. Congress has thus delegated to the Supreme Court the full
and unqualified power to presoribe, to regulate, and to alter writs
for the enforcement of decrees in admiralty; and the Supreme
Court has exercised that power, in prescribi4g the exact process
and regulating the particular mode of executing an admiralty decree
for the payment of money.
The libellant may have an attachment or a capias against the
person of the defendant, or a fieri facias against his goods and
chattels.
These are the only writs, and the mode prescribed is the only
mode, by which decrees in admiralty can be lawfully executed by
the circuit and district courts. And if the rule is of paramount
authority and of binding obligation upon those courts, then they
have no power or competent authority to issue an execution against
the lands of a defendant, to collect the amount due on a decree in
admiralty, for the payment of money.
12
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That the Supreme Court has full power and authority to establish
the rule, I have no doubt.
In the case of Thompson vs. Phillips,Bald. C. C. Rep.
274,
the Court say: "Laws which relate to practice, process, or modes of
proceeding before or after judgment, are exceptions to the thirtyfourth section of the judiciary act, as Congress has legislated on the
subject. The Supreme Court of the United States have established
the distinction to be this: State laws, which furnish the Court a rule
for forming a judgment, are binding on the Federal courts, but not
laws for carrying that judgment into execution-that is, governed
by the acts of Congress and the rules and practice adopted pursuant
thereto."
So, too, in the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Hfolstead, 10 Wheat. 51, where the question arose as to the power of
the Circuit Court of the United States to subject certain property
to execution, by rule of court. The Supreme Court say, that
"there is no doubt that Congress might have legislated more specifically on the subject, and declared what property should be subject to execution from the courts of the United States. But it does
not follow that, because Congress might have done this, they necessarily must do it, and cannot commit the power to courts of justice.
Congress might regulate the whole practice of the courts, if it was
deemed expedient so to do. But this power is vested in the courts."
This exposition of the power of the Supreme Court of the United
States to frame rules in relation to executions and other process,
is conclusive authority in this court.
But it is said that a decree in admiralty operates as a,lien upon
the lands of the defendant, and that where a lien exists, the right
to issue execution, to levy upon and sell the land to satisfy and
discharge the decree, is not only a necessary result of the lien, but
is also authorized by the legislation of Congress.
In England, from which country we derive the fundamental principles of maritime, equity, and common law, no lien on lands is
created by a decree in admiralty; nor, according to long-established
usage, can execution there be issued against lands upon such a
decree. Vol. 1 Comyn's Digest, 893; Clerk's Praxis, 137, 189;
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Godbolt's Rep. 268; Hall's Adm. Prac. 112; Brown's Civ. and
Adm. Law, 410.
And until the statute of Westminster, 2, (13 Ed. I,) judgments
in personal actions were not liens upon land by the common law.
That statute gave the right to issue a writ of elegit, which created
the lien. So, too, in relation to decrees in equity for the payment
of money. They did not operate as liens on land until the act of
1 and 2 Vic. ch. 110. This act of parliament provides that decrees
in chancery for the payment of money "shall have the effect of
judgments in the superior courts of common law."
But no innovation of this kind has ever been incorporated into
the maritime jurisprudence of England; and the same exemption
of lands from admiralty liens obtains in this country, unless it has
been removed by the legislation of Congress.
I can see nothing in the act of Congress of May, 1828, and of
July, 1840, that gives to a decree in admiralty the effect of a lien
on land.
The clause in the third section of the act of 1828, declares that
"cwrits of execution, and other final process, issued onjudgments and
decrees rendered in any of the courts of the United States, and the
proceedings thereupon, shall be the same (except the style) in each
State respectively as are now used in the courts of such States."
This provision has reference, doubtless, to judgments at law and
decrees in chancery, and proceedings upon such judgments and
decrees. It cannot, by any known rule of construction, have application to decrees in admiralty, or to proceedings upon such decrees,
and for the obvious reason that by the constitution and laws of the
United States, the State courts have no admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, and consequently can render no decrees in admiralty and
maritime causes.
Equally fallacious is the inference sought to be drawn from the
fourth section of the act of 1840. This section provides, that
"judgments and decrees shall cease to be liens on real estate in the
same manner as judgments and decrees of the State courts now
cease, by law, to be liens thereon."
The plain import of this statute is, that judgments at law and
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decrees in chancery rendered in the circuit and district courts of the
United States, (in any State,) having liens vpon land, shall cease
to be liens, in the same manner as judgments at law and decrees in
chancery of the courts of such States cease to be liens.
State laws, in virtue of which liens are created on judgments and
decrees in the State courts, furnish rules of property; and it was
the purpose of Congress to put liens of like judgments and decrees
in the Federal courts upon the same footing. It is analogous in
principle to the limitation laws of the several States, which have
always been regarded as affording rules of property, and, therefore,
rules of decision in the Federal courts. The object of the provision,
doubtless, was to obtain uniformity of a rule of property, in courts
of different jurisdictions, and that rule to be in conformity to State
laws.
I am unable to see how the fourth section of the act of 1840
should have reference to liens, which by no possibility can have an
existence in virtue of State laws, and especially as it was the purpose of Congress to limit, and not to extend, the liens of judgments
and decrees rendered in the Federal courts.
Again, it was urged in the argument, that it is in accordance with
the practice and usaqe of the United States courts, to issue executions against land, or decrees in admiralty; and our attention has
been called to the rules of court for the Southern District of New
York, as authority for the practice.
By the 59th rule of the district court for the Southern District of
New York, there is an express consent required, connected with the
stipulation, that if the condition is not performed, the court may
order execution against the goods, chattels, lands, and tenements of
the stipulators; and by the 147th rule of the same court, it is
declared that the writ of fierifacias and venditioni exponas should
be adopted as final process in that court in all cases for the sale of
property, and that the proceedings therein, in admiralty cases,
should be conformable to those on the common law side of that
court.
Those rules were adopted in 1838, and in pursuance of authority
supposed to be conferred by the various acts of Congress then in
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force. Whatever authority to prescribe and regulate process was
given to the circuit and district courts by the judiciary and process
acts of 1789, and the act of 1792, that authority was merged in the
one of like power conferred on the Supreme Court of the United
States by the act of 1842; and the Supreme Court having exercised the power thus conferred, and prescribed the exact process and
designated the particular mode of executing admiralty decrees, it
wculd seem to be conclusive that the inferior courts of the United
States could not adopt process and pursue a practice in conflict
with that ordained by the Supreme Court. But I am not advised
of the existence of any rule of practice upon the subject of final
process and the mode of executing admiralty decrees, adopted by
the circuit and district courts for the Southern District of Ohio.
What the effect would be of a written consent connected with the
stipulation, authorizing the Court to issue execution against the
land of the stipulators, if the condition should not be performed, it
is not now necessary to determine, as no such consent was connected with the stipulation in the case under consideration.
From a careful examination of the question raised by the first
ground of the demurrer, I am led to the unavoidable conclusion
that the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District
of Ohio had no authority to issue an execution against the lands of
the defendants on said decree in admiralty, and, consequently, that
the levy of such execution upon land, and the proceedings of the
marshal in relation thereto, are void and of no effect.
It remains to consider whether, upon the facts disclosed by the
record, the complainants are entitled, in a court of chancery, to the
discovery and general relief prayed for in this case.
It is averred (in substance) by the complainants, in their bill, that
the defendants owe them a sum of money, certain in amount, evidenced by an admiralty decree, rendered by a court of record and
of competent jurisdiction; that a fierifaciashas been issued on said
decree, and no goods and chattels found by the marshal whereon to
levy; that the defendants have lands which can be made subject to
the payment of said decree only through the aid, and by the interposition, of a court of equity. These are simple, and yet they are
the important facts for consideration in this branch of the case.
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It is both the policy and the principle of American as well as
of English jurisprudence, to subject a debtor's property to the payment of his debts; and it is laid down as an undeniable proposition,
that the jurisdiction of a court of equity will be exercised when
the principles of law by which the ordinary courts are guided, give
a right; but the powers of those courts are not sufficient to afford a
complete remedy, or their modes of proceeding are inadequate for
the purpose. Mitford's Pl. 103; 1 Vern. R. 399; 3 Atk. R. 192;
Vesey R. 51; 2 John. Ch. R. 283.
This doctrine, in its broadest sense, was recognized by the Supreme
Court of Ohio in the case of Crane et al. vs Green'sAdm'r, 6 Ohio
R. 429. The Court there say: "That the Chancellor has jurisdiction in those cases where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
cannot be bad at law, is an apothegm by which his power is limited
in every country where the distinction is known between courts of
law and equity. The extent of this restriction has been long since
defined. It is a technical maxim, (say the Court,) adopted by our
legislature in its technical sense. and received the same interpretation here as elsewhere. In our practice we do not give it a restricted
meaning, but sustain our powers to the same extent as other similar
tribunals, where jurisdiction depends on this principle. It is a
part of the general chancery law, that where a class of cases are
the objects of chancery jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is not taken
away because courts of law subsequently administer a remedy."
Hence, it is a principle sanctioned by courts of equity everywhere,
that in order to obtain satisfaction of a judgment at law, where
execution has been issued, and no property found on which to levy,
the judgment creditor may file his bill in a court of chancery for
relief, and he will be entitled to the aid of that court to discover
and apply the debtor's property to the payment of the judgment.
This principle is so well established that illustration and citation
of authorities is deemed to be unnecessary.
The case before us is where a decree in admiralty for the payment
of money was obtained, an execution issued upon it against the
goods and chattels of the defendants, and a return of the writ by
the marshal, with an endorsement of nulla bona.
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I think the case is not distinguishable, in principle, from that of
a proceeding in equity, where the foundation of the suit is an unsatisfied judgment at law. The claim is for the payment of money
as much in the one case as in the other, and both are results of
adjudications of courts of record. It is true, that by the 21st rule
of admiralty practice, the creditor in the one case may have a ca. sa.
against the body of the defendant, which has not been resorted to.
So, too, upon a judgment at law in cases of fraudulent contract, the
creditor may have his writ of capias against the body of the defendant. Yet this cumulative remedy (neglected to be exercised) is,
of itself, no obstacle in the way of equity proceedings to satisfy the
judgment.
The analogy holds good in like proceedings on a decree in admiralty.
The right to a capias against the body is cumulative upon the
right to afieri facias against goods and chattels, and I am unable
to see why the neglecting to issue a capias on the decree should
operate as an obstacle to a chancery proceeding to obtain satisfaction of the debt, any more than a like neglect to issue a capias on a
judgment at law, where a party is entitled to it.
On the whole, I am of the opinion that the demurrer should be
sustained, so far as the allegations in the bill relate to the issuing
of an execution against land, and the levy and other proceedings of
the marshal thereon affecting the lands of the defendants. But, as
the bill in other respects presents a case on which it is both competent and proper for the Court to grant the discovery and general
relief prayed for, the demurrer should be overruled.
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1. A policy which is upon a specified kind of goods, to be brought in a certain kind
of ships, within a stated time, with a rate of premium fixed, leaving nothing but
the quantity and value of the goods to be declared and endorsed on the policy, as
the invoices are received, is a valid, open policy, and might embrace goods that
were lost and known to be lost before they were endorsed on the policy.
2. But where a policy was under-written "for whom it may concern, to be insured
lost or not lost, fifteen thousand dollars on property on board vessel or vessels,
steamboat or steamboats, or land carriage, at and from ports or places, to ports or
places; all sums at risk under this policy to be endorsed hereupon and valued
at the sum endorsed: premium, such per cent. as shall be written against each
endorsement;" and certain goods were lost by a peril of the sea, while on board the
steamer Palmetto, from Philadelphia to Boston, previous to the 23d of larch,
18-58, no application being made to the insurers until the 24th of March, 1858,
to have the same endorsed on the policy, at which time it was publicly known that
the steamer Palmetto was lost, and the endorsement was then refused upon the
ground that the vessel was so lost, and was publicly known to be so, it was held that
the insurer had never assumed the risk, and was therefore not liable to the assured,
because, 1st, the policy was an insurance on property and was wholly wanting in any
description of the kind of property which is to be the subject of the risk; 2d, because
no ports are named from or to which it is to be transported ; 3d, because there is
no limitation to a particular kind of vessels, but the language extends to goods
transported by steamboats, sailing vessels, and land carriage; 4th, because no
time is named within which the policy is to be limited; and, 5th, because no rate
of premium is ascertained and fixed by the policy.
3. Where matters material to the consummation of a contract are to be adjusted
and agreed between the parties before an endorsement can be made on the policy,
the risk does not attach until such adjustment is perfected.
4. What is necessary to constitute a valid open or running policy.

This was an action of contract on a Policy of Insurance, dated
Feb. 11, 1858, whereby the defendants caused Hartshorn & Co.,
"for whom it may concern, to be insured, lost or not lost, fifteen
thousand dollars on property on board vessel, or vessels, steamboat,
or steamboats, or land carriage, at and from ports or places to ports
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or places." "All sums at risk inder this policy to be endorsed
hereupon and valued at the sum endorsed." "Premium, such per
cent. as shall be written against each endorsement."
The goods were lost by the peril of the sea while on board the
steamer Palmetto, from Philadelphia' to Boston, and previous to 28d
of March, 1858. The evidence tended to prove that the plaintiffs
applied, on the morning of 23d March, to have the goods by the
steamer Palmetto endorsed on their policy, that the plaintiffs had,
upon receiving an invoice of a part of the goods, on the day
previous, and supposing that other goods were also about to be
sent, told their book-keeper that goods were coming, and that
it would be necessary to get an endorsement for $4,000 on the
policy. The plaintiffs had not received the bills of lading before
the 23d March. The book-keeper omitted, by his neglect, to make
any application on that day to the defendants to have the same
endorsed on the policy. But the next morning he did apply for
such endorsement to be made thereon, but not until it was publicly
known that the steamer was lost, although the book-keeper testified
that when making the application he had not heard of the same.
The endorsement was refused by the defendants, upon the ground
that the vessel was lost and publicly known to be so. The defendants alleged that it was too late; they were not bound unless the
endorsement was on.
The question was upon the right of the plaintiffs to recover upon
this policy for a loss occurring under these circumstances. The
Court held that the defendants were not liable. They further held
that usage was not competent evidence to fix the rate of premium,
when the evidence had an express refusal of the company to take
the risk, upon a policy drawn on the present form.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
DFw.EY, J.-The contract of insurance, like other contracts,
requires a legal consideration to render it valid. The insurer, for
a premium to be paid by the insured, undertakes to indemnify
against loss on property exposed to peril. That the insurer is not
allowed to receive or retain a premium for insurance when no risk
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has attached, is abundantly shown by the numerous cases where
such pre-paid premium has been recovered back by the assured.
It must, from the nature of the case, be equally true that the payment of a premium, or a liability to pay the same, must always exist
on the part of the assured, when the insurers are responsible for a
risk. In those cases, where the amount and value of goods are
known, and also the mode of conveyance is arranged, the matter of
premium is very easily adjusted between the parties, the same being
paid either in cash, or by a note payable at a future day for the
precise amount to be paid for the risk. The money or note thus
taken is the absolute property of the insurer, and furnishes the consideration of the risk assumed. When the quantity of merchandise
to be forwarded is not precisely known, the rate of premium is definitely fixed, and the gross sum to be paid made to depend upon the
value subsequently ascertained from the invoice. The difficulty in
the present case arises from the peculiar terms of this policy. It
is an open or running policy, the precise property to be covered by
it to be ascertained and declared after the date of the policy, and
open to the objections hereinafter stated. No doubt that in reference to an open policy drawn in the form many such are, it would
be competent for the assured to declare the subject to which the
policy is to be applied after he had received knowledge of the loss.
The validity of a general insurance, describing the articles of merchandise to be hereafter shipped on account of the assured, was
sanctioned by the King's Bench in Kinley vs. RByan, 2 Hen. Black.
343. The policy was at and from Granada to Liverpool in ship or
ships warranted to sail before the 1st of August, 1793. It was
said in that case by the Court that the legality of a general insurance on goods to come in ship or ships was too well established
both by usage and authority to be disputed. An insurance of this
character had been sustained without any apparent objection in the
earlier case of 1Henchman vs. Offey, reported in a note to the last
cited case. In the latter case the policy was on goods to come in
ships from Bengal to London, which should sail between the 1st of
July and 31st December, 1780. But in neither of these cases were
the terms of the policy such as are found in the case before us.
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That policies on goods by a ship or ships, to be thereafter declared,
are valid, and that the party may be declared after a loss, seems to
be assumed in Phillips In. 67. This would be a perfectly reasonable construction of such contracts as applied to goods which were
directly the subject of the policy, and for which a premium had been
stipulated to be paid. Take the case of a shipment of certain goods
ordered by a resident of New York to be shipped from New Orleans,
the character of the goods, and the mode of conveyance, and rate of
premium, all declared in the policy, but the precise amount or value,
on the particular ship or ships by which they were to be sent,
unknown to the assured. In such case, the parties understand the
insurance to cover all the goods ordered, and the premium agreed
to be paid attaches to be forwarded under such order. Here is a
reciprocity in the obligations assumed by the parties. The premium
for the risk is paid, or agreed to be paid, and the policy attaches to
the goods when the transportation commences. In such case, it
may properly be held that the endorsement on the policy may be
made of the goods forwarded after the knowledge of the loss has
come to the assured.
But the plaintiffs particularly rely upon the case of Carvervs.
ManufacturersIns. Co., 6 Gray 214, as decisive in their favor. To
a certain extent, it certainly has an important bearing upon the
present case. It sanctions contracts between assured and insurers,
by which the former may in certain cases declare the application of
the policy to goods lost after the knowledge of such loss has been
received by him. As already previously remarked, there are contracts of insurance where the parties obviously intend this, and
both parties are bound whenever the goods are shipped to treat them
as insured goods, for which on the one hand the premium is to be
paid, and on the other the policy is to attach.
When the policy is upon a specified kind of goods, to be brought
in a certain kind of ships, within a stated time, from a certain port
named, and with a rate of premium fixed, leaving nothing but the
quantity and value of the goods to be declared and indorsed on the
policy as invoices might be received, we see no objection to giving
legal effect to it, as embracing any such goods that might be lost,
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and known to be lost before they were indorsed on the policy.
Such a policy would imply that all the goods of the kind amend,
shipped within the time and manner stated, were to be covered by
the insurance, and that, as to all such goods, a premium would be
earned, and good faith would require both parties to give full effect
to such a policy.
The case of Carver vs. 1Llranufacturers Insurance Company
bad much of this character of certainty and definite understanding
of the parties on all points material to the risk, and as to the rate
of premium, leaving nothing to be done but to enter the amount of
the shipment upon the policy from time to time as they should come
to the knowledge of the assured. It was definite in the following
particulars: 1st. The character of the property to be insured was
stated in the policy-''Ootton gins and bandings." 2d. The ports from
and which they were to be shipped was stated, viz: at and from New
York and New Orleans. 3d. They were to be shipped by steamers.
4th. The time and duration of the policy fixed "1to be closed in twelve
months if not sooner filled." 5th. The rate of premium fixed in
the policy, viz : "1one per cent." Under such a policy, it might
well be held that the parties contemplated an insurance of all the
"cotton gins and bandings" of the plaintiff that might be shipped in
steamers from or to the ports named, to an amount not exceeding
$25,000 during the period of twelve months from the date of the
policy. But the policy in the present case has not one of these five
elements: 1st. It is an insurance on property and is wholly wanting
in any description of the kind of property which is to be the subject
of the risk. 2d. No ports are named from or to which it is to be
transported. 3d. No limitation to a particular kind of vessels, but
extending to goods transported by steamboats, sailing vessels, and
land carriage. 4th. No time named within which the policy is to
be limited. 5th. No rate of premium fixed by the policy, the premium on the same being this, "the consideration for this insurance
by the assured at and after the rate of such per cent. as shall be
written against each endorsement." The policy itself demonstrates
that the endorsement required was to be an act having the concurrence and sanction of both parties, as the rate of premium in every
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case of a new endorsement was to be such per cent. "as shall be
written against each endorsement." The assured surely had not
the right to fix the rate, nor was he obliged to make an endorsement
with such a rate of premium, however high, as the insurers might
demand. No rate of premium being fixed, no kind of vessels to be
employed stated, no ports to or from which the goods were to be
transported, the species of merchandise to be shipped entirely uncertain, all show that this was an inchoate contract of insurance as toshipments of property ordered after the date of the policy, and was
to be practically a new and separate insurance on each successive
parcel of goods as they were endorsed on the policy, and a rate of
premium, as agreed upon, written against such endorsement. That
the plaintiff so understood it, and acted upon the hypothesis that an
endorsement was necessary to give effect to the policy as to new
shipments, is strongly indicated by the course of the evidence introduced at the trial. One of the witnesses says, that one of the plaintiffs told him on 22d March that there were goods coming, and it
would be necessary to get an endorsement on the policy. One of
the plaintiffs testifies thaton Monday afternoon, 22d March, he said
to the book-keeper, "We have a large quantity of goods coming by
the steamer; I do not know when she sails, but you must take care
to have it endorsed on the policy." Suppose the goods lost by the
plaintiffs, and the subject of the present action, had arrived in safety
at Boston, and no endorsement of the same had ever been made on
the policy, or any proposition to do so, would the plaintiff have been
legally bound to pay a premiuni"for the insurance thereof, the same
as if an endorsement had been made? This would seem to be a
test question as to the liability of the insured to make good the loss
of the same, as in the one case there would be a consideration for
the promise to do so, and in the other there would not. To make
such an agreement, binding the stipulation and risk proposed, must
be mutually understood by the parties. 2 Phil. Ins. 11. Ocean
Insurance Company vs. Carrington,3 Conn. 357. Here they were
not, but matters material to the consummation of the contract were
to be adjusted and agreed upon by the parties before an endorsement of new shipments of goods could properly l5e made. Without,
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therefore, at all questioning the validity of a class of cases of opeii
and running policies of a more restricted character to which reference has been made, and where the endorsement was entered upon
the policy after the knowledge of the loss, we are of the opinion
that the present case does not fall within them.
As to the question of the competency of the proposed evidence
of usage in respect to open and running policies, that the premium
is to be at the market rate, this evidence was properly rejected, first,
because such usage might well exist as to the class of open policies
which have been referred to as valid, being definite in their description of the goods, the mode of conveyancce, the ports from and to
which they were to be carried, and the time of transportation, and
not effect this case. But if the inquiry was as to a usage more comprehensive it would not avail the plaintiff, as it would be inconsistent with the terms of the policy to give effect to any such usage.
The provisions of this policy forbid this species of evidence. There
are so many circumstances that might exist here affecting the rate
of premium, that it could not well be adjusted by adopting any
principle of market rate of premium. But, further, the parties here,
by the terms of the policy, provide that the "premium shall be such
per cent. as shall be written against the endorsement," excluding
the idea of a previously agreed mode of fixing the rate, but leaving
that, as we have already construed the contract to imply, to be mutually agreed by the parties before endorsing the risk.
We have found very few adjudicated cases bearing upon the points
which, we think, are material in the present case. The decision of
the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Downieville vs. Sun M1utual Insurance Company, 12 Louisa. An. Reports, 259, upon an open and
running policy, subject to some of the objections now urged, will be
found to be in accordance with the views we have taken.
Judgment for the defendants.

